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This paper first describes those features of the electricity supply industry that 
make a prospective market monitoring process essential to a well-functioning wholesale 
market.   Some of these features are shared with the securities industry, although the 
technology of electricity production and delivery make a reliable transmission network a 
necessary condition for an efficient wholesale market.  These features of the electricity 
supply industry also make antitrust or competition law alone an inadequate foundation for 
an electricity market monitoring process.   This paper provides examples of both the 
successes and failures of market monitoring from several international markets. More 
than ten years of experience with the electricity industry re-structuring process has 
demonstrated that market failures are more likely and substantially more harmful to 
consumers than other market failures because of how electricity is produced and 
delivered and the crucial role it plays in the modern economy. Wholesale market 
meltdowns of varying magnitudes and durations have occurred in electricity markets 
around the world, and many of them could have been prevented if a prospective market 
monitoring process backed by the prevailing regulatory authority had been in place at the 
start of the market. 
   1
1. Introduction 
  There is a growing consensus around the world that a well-functioning wholesale 
electricity market requires a prospective market monitoring process. More than ten years 
of experience with the electricity industry re-structuring process has demonstrated that 
market failures are more likely and substantially more harmful to consumers than other 
market failures because of how electricity is produced and delivered and the crucial role 
it plays in the modern economy. Wholesale market meltdowns of varying magnitudes and 
durations have occurred in electricity markets around the world, and many of them could 
have been prevented if a prospective market monitoring process backed by the prevailing 
regulatory authority had been in place at the start of the market. 
 
  The purpose of this paper is first to describe those features of the electricity 
supply industry that make a prospective market monitoring process essential to a well-
functioning wholesale market.  Some of these features are shared with the securities 
industry.  However, the technology of electricity production and delivery make a reliable 
transmission network a necessary condition for an efficient wholesale market.  These 
features of the electricity supply industry also make antitrust or competition law alone an 
inadequate foundation for an electricity market monitoring process.   
 
The next section draws lessons from wholesale electricity markets around the 
world for the design of an effective market monitoring process.  The first lesson is that 
the market monitoring process should be forward-looking, anticipating how small market 
design flaws can develop into market failures that significantly harm market participants. 
The second lesson is that the market-monitoring process must be fully supported by the 
regulatory process. The regulator must have the willingness and ability to intervene to fix 
any problems discovered by the market monitoring process as rapidly as possible.  The 
third lesson is the need for the market monitor to prepare consistent measures of market 
and system performance that are comparable over time and across markets.  The fourth 
lesson is the need for public release of all data submitted to and produced by the market 
and system operators. Having this data readily available to all market participants will 
enable them to become more sophisticated players in the wholesale market in the sense of 
being better able to protect themselves against potentially harmful market outcomes.   
Public availability of this data will also allow other entities besides the market monitor 
and regulator to perform analyses of market performance. The final lesson is that the 
market monitoring process should be independent of the market operator, system operator 
and the political process.  This will limit the incentive the market monitor might have to 
distort analyses of market or system performance to favor any stakeholder, instead of 
focusing on its role as an unbiased provider of analyses of market outcomes. 
 
This paper provides examples of both the successes and failures of market 
monitoring from several international markets to illustrate these points. The United 
Kingdom (UK) provides an informative example of an electricity market that began 
operation with an inadequate market monitoring process. In fact, a major motivation for 
the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) was to implement a stronger market 
oversight process.  New Zealand provides another example of the dangers of an 
inadequate market monitoring process.  Its market was organized along the lines of the   2
UK, but over the past three years it has experienced several sustained periods of 
extremely high prices that finally led to an overhaul of its market monitoring process.  
The United States (US) also had an inadequate market monitoring process at the start of 
its electricity re-structuring program. This allowed a number significant market 
performance problems to occur, including the highly publicized California disaster during 
the period June 2000 to June 2001, before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), the US wholesale market regulator, implemented significant reforms to its 
market monitoring processes. 
 
  There have been a few initial successes in electricity market monitoring.   
Australia provides perhaps the best example of the necessary conditions for an effective 
market monitoring process.  There are also a number of positive lessons from the 
experience in the US, both before and after the reform of the electricity market 
monitoring process at FERC. 
2. Why Electricity Markets Are Different 
Electricity markets share many features with securities markets.  Participants buy 
and sell rights to inject and withdraw electricity from the transmission network, much as 
securities investors buy and sell ownership shares of firms. Contrary to common 
perception, a buyer of electricity is not purchasing megawatt-hours (MWh) of energy 
produced by a specific generation unit.  A buyer is only purchasing the right to withdraw 
that quantity of MWhs from a specific location in the network and a seller is paid for 
injecting a certain quantity of MWhs into the grid at a specified location in network.   
 
Electricity markets differ from securities markets because virtually all electricity 
produced must be delivered to final consumers through the transmission network, and the 
actions of other market participants directly impact the ability of a market participant to 
sell or consume electricity.  Consequently, all market participants share a common 
interest in reliable operation of the transmission network, even though they may often 
find it unilaterally optimal to engage in behavior that degrades overall grid reliability.   
For example, a supplier withholding capacity from the day-ahead market in order to 
increase the price it receives for the energy it sells, can create a reliability problem for all 
suppliers because the system operator is subsequently unable to dispatch the necessary 
generation units to the levels needed to meet real-time demand without increasing the risk 
of a system failure. 
 
Two rationales for electricity market monitoring common to securities markets, 
are to ensure that:  (1) both sides of each transaction comply with all contractual 
obligations and (2) maximum liquidity exists in the spot market.  A necessary condition 
for an efficient wholesale electricity market is that participants produce or consume 
electricity under the terms and conditions specified in their bids into the market.  Failure 
to comply with contractual obligations not only increases the cost to the violating firm of 
transacting in the future, it can also reduce the reliability of the transmission network and 
therefore the cost of other suppliers and load-serving entities transacting.  A liquid spot 
market implies that unexpectedly large transactions can take place at virtually any instant 
in time without causing substantial price movements.  If there is insufficient liquidity in   3
the spot market, prices will be extremely sensitive to small changes in amount of energy 
purchased or sold in this market.  An illiquid spot market can also reduce the liquidity of 
the forward market. If either side of the market is uncertain about the terms and 
conditions of delivery of a forward contract for electricity (including the spot price on the 
delivery date) or their ability to unwind this forward contract position at some future date, 
this will increase the cost of participating in the forward market and therefore reduce the 
liquidity of the forward market.  These are the major reasons why electricity markets 
must be monitored to ensure there is sufficient liquidity in the spot and short-term 
forward markets. 
 
  In contrast to participants in financial markets, buyers and sellers of wholesale 
electricity have no choice about how to take or provide delivery on the electricity they 
have purchased or sold. All electricity must be delivered through the single transmission 
network serving a given geographic area.  If the network is poorly operated, this increases 
the cost of participating in the wholesale electricity market for all entities.  Inefficiencies 
in system operation not only impact prices in the spot market, but also the forward and 
futures market prices. The spot market is always an alternative option available to buyers 
and sellers, so it is the relevant opportunity cost of participating in the forward market.   
Consequently, there is a much greater need for market monitoring in electricity markets 
relative to financial markets because one supplier’s privately profitable behavior can 
significantly degrade the ability of another supplier to inject the energy it has sold or for 
consumers at certain locations in the network to withdraw the energy they have 
purchased. 
 
Because electricity markets require supply to equal demand at every instant in 
time at every location in the transmission network, and electrons flow according to the 
laws of physics rather than according to the terms of a financial contract, privately-
profitable behavior by one market participant that degrades system reliability can 
immediately reduce the ability of other buyers and sellers to fulfill their contractual 
obligations. As noted earlier, because all suppliers deliver their electricity to final 
consumers through a common transmission network and if one supplier finds it profitable 
to inject significantly more or less energy into the network than the system operator 
expects, this can limit the ability of other suppliers and load-serving entities to inject and 
withdraw energy from the network.  Market monitoring is therefore necessary to ensure 
that the unilateral profit-maximizing actions of certain market participants do not 
significantly degrade system reliability and market efficiency. 
 
  Electricity is also unique in the sense that the technology of producing and 
delivering electricity places significant constraints on how a wholesale electricity market 
can operate.  For this reason, it is important to coordinate the design of the market 
protocols with the design of the engineering protocols used to operate the system.  This 
fact implies that both engineering and economics expertise are essential to an effective 
market monitoring process, and these two sources of expertise must interact seamlessly.   
 
  Finally, this market monitoring process should be independent of the system and 
market operator and all market participants. One might think that this market monitoring   4
function could be a department or division of the system operator.  However, both market 
and system operation can often be undertaken at the expense of certain market 
participants.  It is often the case that protocols that the system operator finds optimal can 
unnecessarily impose significant burdens on market participants. For this reason, it is 
essential to have an independent entity with no stake in market outcomes analyze and 
make recommendations on coordinating these two functions to ensure that system and 
market operating protocols enhance the efficiency of market outcomes, rather than simply 
make the system or market operator’s job easier. 
 
  The combination of the constraints on market operation caused by the engineering 
requirements to balance supply and demand second by second at all locations in the 
network, the high cost of storing electricity, the inelastic hourly wholesale demand 
(because of how electricity is priced to final consumers), and strict capacity constraints 
on production process make electricity markets extremely susceptible to the exercise of 
unilateral market power.  Different from almost any other market, the exercise of 
unilateral market power can result in enormous wealth transfers from consumers to 
producers of electricity in very short periods of time.  Because activities associated with 
the unilateral exercise of market power are not typically illegal under antitrust or 
competition law, these laws may be inadequate to prevent these wealth transfers. A 
market monitoring process is the most effective means of identifying and mitigating the 
harmful exercise of unilateral market power. 
 
A final lesson from these episodes of significant unilateral market power from 
around the world is that it is extremely difficult to undo these wealth transfers by 
regulatory intervention after the fact.  Consequently, a far more effective strategy is to 
prevent these events from occurring by vigilant market monitoring beyond that required 
by antitrust or competition law, with the goal of intervening before a small unilateral 
market power problem can become a large one and therefore result in enormous wealth 
transfers and potentially large efficiency losses. 
3.  Lessons from around the World 
  This section draws upon international experience with electricity industry re-
structuring over the past decade to illustrate the five major lessons described above. 
3.1. Need for a Prospective Market Monitoring Process 
Virtually all electricity markets around the world have experienced a sustained 
period with the exercise of significant unilateral market power.  The markets that have 
fared the worst are those that did not have a prospective market monitoring process in 
place.  The United Kingdom market is the earliest example, the California market in the 
US is the best-known example, and the New Zealand market the most recent example. 
 
3.1.1.  United Kingdom Experience 
 
The electricity pool in the United Kingdom was formed in 1990 by a group of 
generation and distribution companies that jointly owned the National Grid Company 
(NGC), the operator of the transmission network and wholesale market.  The specific role   5
and responsibilities of the Pool was codified in the Pooling and Settlement Agreement 
(PSA), which all members signed.  The Pool Rules specified the procedures which NGC 
used to operate the market, and gave the protocols for converting bids into prices. The 
PSA also contained a process for modifying the PSA, but the process turned out to be 
very convoluted.   
 
  This resistance to change was due to the fact that the Pool was governed by its 
members, with limited oversight by the regulatory body—the Office of Electricity 
Regulation (Offer)—or any other independent market monitoring entity.  If a market 
design defect were identified, a sub-committee would be established to formulate a 
market rule change to solve the problem.  This solution would then be voted on by the 
Pool Executive Committee (PEC). The PEC originally contained five generator 
representatives and five retailers. The structure was subsequently reformed to reflect the 
blurred distinction between generators and retailers (many companies were both) and 
allow consumer representation. 
 
  Because different market participants had voting weights based on their size, it 
was possible for the larger firms to block changes unfavorable to their financial interests.  
If a Pool member failed to obtain its desired outcome from participation in the Pool’s 
own procedures, this dissenting company could still appeal to the regulator, further 
slowing the process of reform.  A number of issues were deemed too contentious to 
resolve in time for the market opening in 1990, and were scheduled for subsequent 
resolution by the Pool governance process.  Most of these created winners and losers, 
(which is why they could not be decided in 1990) and the Pool was never particularly 
successful in dealing with them.   
 
  The Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer) also found the non-responsiveness of 
the Pool governance process to problems in system and market operation increasingly 
difficult to deal with.  For the reasons described above, Offer had little ability to 
implement prospective market rule changes to address small market design flaws before 
they caused significant harm.  Moreover, the regulator was largely unable to implement 
market rule changes to address market design flaws that remained from the start of the 
market.  For example, the problem of generation owner market power was identified 
early on and the need for divestiture of fossil-fuel generation capacity into a larger 
number of suppliers than National Power and PowerGen was recommended. However, 
ultimately the divestiture of some plant did not occur until the two dominant suppliers 
were subject to severe political pressure and substantial amounts of unilateral market 
power had been exercised for a number of years.  In addition, the use of the capacity 
payment mechanism to enhance the ability of suppliers in the Pool to raise prices was 
identified during the early years of the operation of the Pool.  Wolak and Patrick (1997) 
described this mechanism in detail and provided evidence of its use to raise market 
prices.  Despite these inefficient market rules, they remained in place until the Pool was 
replaced by the New Trading Arrangements (NETA), which went into effect in March of 
2001. Green (1999) provides a very informative discussion of the difficulty with 
implementing market rule changes and general regulatory oversight created by 
governance structure of the Pool.   6
 
 
  There were a number of highly publicized market rules changes implemented 
with NETA, but an important part of this reform process was to strengthen the 
governance process of the electricity market.  The NETA market required all suppliers to 
sign a new license agreement—the connection and use of system (CUSC) agreement—
which gave Ofgem, the new combined gas and electricity regulator, the power to be a 
prospective market monitor with an enhanced ability to intervene to correct market 
design flaws.  Specifically, the process of changing market rules in response to market 
design flaws has been significantly streamlined. One UK market commentator states with 
respect to the market rule change process that, “This is a great improvement on the 
stagnation that accompanied the change processes in the Pool, and it appears that Ofgem 
had delivered what it intended to—flexible governance.” (Cornwall, 2001).  Moreover, 
different from the Pool regime, Ofgem now has the last word on all market rule changes.  
Both the flexibility in the change process and the ability to implement needed market 
changes are important components of the apparent success of NETA. 
 
3.1.2.  The California Experience 
 
As discussed in detail in Wolak (2003a and 2003b), a major cause of the 
California crisis was the unwillingness of FERC and the California Public Utilities 
Commission to intervene to fix market design flaws identified by the Market Surveillance 
Committee (MSC) of the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). The MSC 
had identified the major market design flaws as early as of the Summer of 1998. The lack 
of incentives for the major California load-serving entities (LSEs) to engage in sufficient 
forward contracts for their retail energy obligations and the potential dangers associated 
with over-reliance on the spot market for their wholesale energy purchases were 
identified in the August 1998 MSC report to FERC (Wolak, Nordhaus, and Shapiro 
(1998)).  This report also noted the need to face final consumers, particularly large 
industrial and commercial customers, with hourly wholesale price signals instead of a 
frozen retail price of electricity that was the same for all hours of the year.  Although 
these warnings were repeated in subsequent MSC reports to FERC and a number of 
remedies were suggested, few of the necessary changes in the wholesale and retail market 
policies were implemented. 
 
In addition, when the exercise of unilateral market power began to result in 
significant wealth transfers from consumers to electricity producers during the summer of 
2000, FERC took no action to intervene to fix the market design flaws that created these 
circumstances.   As discussed in Wolak (2003a), not until January 1, 2001 did FERC 
implement “remedies” for this exercise of unilateral market power.  However, a number 
of independent entities, including both MSC and Market Monitoring Committee (MMC) 
of the California Power Exchange, argued that these remedies could very likely make 
matters worse.  In fact, the market outcomes during the period January to June of 2001 
are consistent with these “remedies” enhancing, rather than limiting, the ability of 
suppliers to exercise unilateral market power.  In particular, after this implementation 
date, average spot prices rose to over $300/MWh and the first period of rolling blackouts   7
immediately followed.  As Wolak (2003a) notes, despite peak demands of over 44,000 
MWh during the Summer of 2000 no rolling blackouts occurred. These first occurred 
following the implementation of the FERC “remedies” when peak daily demands were 
less than 33,000 MWh. 
  
The purchase of substantial quantities of forward contracts by the California 
Department of Water Resources during the Winter and Spring of 2001 locked in a 
substantial quantity of energy for California during the Summer of 2001 and onwards. 
Conditions in the California market improved in mid-June 2001 when many of these 
contracts began making deliveries.  However, attempts by California to obtain significant 
refunds from FERC for wholesale prices in excess of the “just and reasonable” levels 
required by the Federal Power Act of 1930 for the period June 2000 to June 2001 were 
largely unsuccessful despite an admission by the FERC that these prices were “unjust and 
unreasonable.”  In spite of FERC's unwillingness to order substantial refunds for these 
unjust and unreasonable prices, there has been a clear change in FERC policy in favor of 
prospective market monitoring over the past two years. 
 
The Office of Market Oversight and Investigation (OMOI) at FERC was formed 
in early 2002.  The OMOI has three major centers of activity—oversight/assessment, 
investigation/enforcement and planning/outreach. The first monitors market performance, 
the second follows any leads turned up by the monitoring process for further 
investigation to determine what regulatory actions should be taken, and the third provides 
strategy and interagency coordination.  This new division of FERC currently employs 
more than 100 staff, with approximately half hired from other parts of FERC and the 
remainder hired from the outside. The recent downturn in the US energy sector has 
allowed the OMOI to hire a number of highly qualified candidates with significant 
industry experience, much to the benefit of the market monitoring process.  Several 
members of OMOI are assigned to monitor each of the four currently operating wholesale 
markets in the US.  In addition, some of the markets even have OMOI staff stationed at 
the site of the market operator to follow the day-to-day activities of the market and 
system operator. 
 
In addition to a far more vigilant market monitoring process, FERC has also made 
a conscious policy change to become more forward-looking in its market oversight 
efforts by adopting policies designed to identify and address market design flaws before 
they can impose significant harm to market efficiency and system reliability. 
 
3.1.3. New Zealand 
 
New Zealand experienced a sustained period of extremely high wholesale prices 
during the period June to September of 2001 and again during the period June to 
September of 2003.  In response, the New Zealand government abandoned its “light-
handed regulation” of the wholesale market.   Prior to 2003, the New Zealand electricity 
industry was organized much the same way as the former UK electricity Pool.  The 
industry was self-regulating and appointed an independent Market Surveillance 
Committee (NZMSC) to oversee its actions.     8
 
Because it was appointed by the members of the industry and not backed by any 
formal government regulator, the NZMSC found it difficult to take positions contrary to 
the interests of the industry.  For example, in response to the initial period of extremely 
high spot prices, claimed by two market participants to be due to the exercise of unilateral 
market power, the NZMSC issued a report investigating this “Claimed Undesirable 
Situation” in the New Zealand electricity market.   Despite average prices during June 
2001 that were more than 4 times the average prices for the previous year in a system 
with more than 65 percent hydroelectric capacity, the NZMSC concluded that, “the 
Committee does not find that an “Undesirable Situation” in NZEM (New Zealand 
Electricity Market) existed during 2001 (up to the end of June) and, in particular, in May 
and June of 2001.”  As a consequence, few actions were taken to prevent almost the same 
sequence of events during the same time period of 2003. 
 
Partially in response to these events, the New Zealand Minister of Energy adopted 
the Electricity Governance Regulations in 2003, which established a seven-member 
Electricity Commission to take over governance functions.  The Electricity Commission 
was also put in charge of taking actions to ensure that another period of extremely high 
prices would not occur in the future.   The Electricity Commission also has the power to 
compel suppliers to offer long-term contracts for a pre-determined portion of their 
expected output.  It is also responsible for modeling and forecasting future demand and 
supply conditions in the industry and determining transmission investment and pricing.  
In short, the Electricity Commission has given the New Zealand market a prospective 
market monitoring process with substantial powers to intervene in the market to prevent 
periods of sustained high spot prices such as those that occurred in June to September of 
2001 and 2003. 
3.2.  Need for Support from Relevant Regulatory Authority 
In virtually all cases, the primary reason wholesale market design flaws were not 
corrected before significant wealth transfers occurred was because of insufficient 
integration of the market monitoring process into the regulatory process.   The US 
experience is most instructive in this regard because at the start of each regional 
wholesale market, FERC emphasized the importance of effective market monitoring 
protocols.  However, FERC devoted little effort to designing a regulatory structure to 
enforce these market monitoring protocols.  Because the UK Pool and New Zealand 
market were operated by market participants with little direct regulatory oversight, there 
was also little regulatory backing for the market monitoring process in these countries.   
With the possible exception of the Australian electricity industry, in all other countries of 
the world the failure to integrate the market monitoring process with the regulatory 
process has been the major reason that market participants have failed to realize the full 
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3.2.1.  United States 
 
Before a regional wholesale market could be approved, FERC required that the 
independent system operator (ISO) file a set of market monitoring protocols that would 
become part of the ISO’s tariff.  All ISOs were required to have internal market 
monitoring departments and several ISOs decided to include an independent market 
monitoring entity to oversee system operation and the operation of the wholesale market.   
These market monitoring protocols defined the duties of both the ISO’s own market 
monitoring department and the independent market monitoring entity.  However, there 
was very little specificity on how the ISO’s internal market monitor and the independent 
market monitor would interact with FERC.  When market design flaws were identified 
and called to the attention of FERC, an extremely cumbersome process was in place to 
attempt to correct these market design flaws.  When the significant problem arose in the 
California market during the early Summer of 2000, FERC had no process in place to 
make use of the information provided by the California ISO’s Department of Market 
Analysis (DMA) and Market Surveillance Committee (MSC) to implement market rule 
changes that would correct these market design flaws. 
 
As is discussed above, FERC was well aware of the market design flaws in the 
California market long before the electricity crisis of June 2000 to June 2001 occurred. 
Moreover, throughout this period the DMA and MSC prepared numerous reports on the 
performance of the California market and made a number of recommendations for 
addressing the market design flaws they identified.  These recommendations were largely 
ignored by FERC.  Certainly one reason for this was the lack of any formal regulatory 
backing for the California market monitoring process by FERC.  In particular, during this 
entire process, the analysis and comments of the DMA and MSC were treated in the same 
manner as those from other stakeholders, such as generation unit owners, load-serving 
entities and other state and federal entities.  This occurred despite the fact that both 
market monitoring entities has access to confidential market outcome data (something 
none of the other stakeholders had) and prepared numerous reports on market 
performance that were submitted to FERC using this data.  In short, the failure to 
integrate the market monitoring process into its regulatory process prevented FERC from 
benefiting from the analyses prepared by the DMA and MSC early enough in the process 
to implement the necessary market rule changes. 
 
  In fact, as noted above, because the OMOI division of FERC was not yet in place, 
the FERC staff (in Washington, D.C.) was not nearly as familiar with the workings of the 
California market as the DMA or MSC.  The FERC staff report on the performance of the 
California market (that formed the basis for its “remedies” implemented in January 1, 
2001) reflected this lack of familiarity with the market.  It used only publicly available 
data and telephone conversations with market participants.  Several parts of this analysis 
revealed significant misunderstandings of a number of aspects of the operation of the 
California market that could have easily been cleared up with more open lines of 
communication between FERC staff and the DMA and MSC.  Consequently, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the “remedies” implemented as a result of this analysis led to more   10
adverse conditions in the California market.  Wolak (2003a) provides an analysis of this 
sequence of events. 
 
  Although the California crisis was largely solved by the decision of the State of 
California to purchase forward contracts during the Winter and Spring of 2001, a number 
of lessons have been learned by FERC from this experience.  Specifically, it has 
attempted to increase the degree of coordination between FERC and the California 
market monitoring process.  The most visible evidence is that two full-time FERC staff is 
stationed at the California ISO to interface with the ISO and FERC staff in Washington.  
In addition, FERC has relaxed its rules on ex parte communications during regulatory 
proceedings for market monitors.   This has reduced the barriers to FERC staff interacting 
with the relevant market monitors at the various ISOs.  The formation of the OMOI at 
FERC with specific staff devoted to each regional market is another step toward greater 
integration.   Finally, FERC has also encouraged each of the ISOs to file oversight and 
investigation protocols that officially increase the degree of integration between the 
market monitoring process and FERC’s regulatory oversight. These changes are very 
positive steps towards providing the necessary regulatory foundation for the market 
monitoring process, but this transition is far from complete. 
 
3.2.2.  The United Kingdom 
 
The Pool regime in the UK had no independent market monitoring process 
besides that performed by Offer (the Office of Electricity Regulation).  For the reasons 
discussed above, the major problem faced by Offer was its inability to implement the 
necessary market rule changes. The NETA has largely addressed this issue, although 
there still is a question of the adequacy of the market monitoring process for NETA. 
 
  A major issue of continuing debate in the UK is whether a Market Abuse License 
Condition (MALC) is a necessary part of the market monitoring process.  During the 
formation of the NETA, Ofgem, the combined electricity and natural gas regulator, 
argued for a condition in the license or legal agreement that allowed each market 
participant to sell energy only if it agreed to be subject to penalties and sanctions for 
abusing its market power.  The Competition Commission, the UK competition authority, 
was charged with determining whether such a provision should be included in the license 
for generation unit owner to sell power in the UK. 
 
  Ofgem wrote at the time, “Neither, we believe, can the potential abuse of 
substantial market power be adequately regulated under general competition legislation 
(although the Competition Act of 1998 provides a welcome strengthening of regulation 
against anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant positions) nor financial 
services legislation.  This is because of particular physical and economic conditions 
associated with electricity wholesale markets and electricity networks--specifically the 
need for instantaneous (real-time) matching of supply and demand to maintain security 
and quality of supplies, coupled with the non-storability of electricity and the limited 
ability of the demand-side to respond to price movements in the very short-term.”  (p. 2, 
Ofgem, 2000).   11
 
Although a license provision prohibiting abuse of market power appeared to be an 
effective mechanism for limiting the exercise of market power, the difficulty Ofgem ran 
into was how to distinguish the unilateral exercise of market power from abuse of market 
power.  It was never able to find a satisfactory way to make this distinction, and many 
economists including Wolak (2000), provided comments stating that this was not possible 
in a manner that did not introduce significant market inefficiencies. For this reason, 
Wolak (2000) argued against the implementation of a MALC.  The Competition 
Commission eventually decided against a MALC, although periodically this issue re-
appears when prices in the UK begin to rise. 
 
This debate about the need for a MALC raises a very important point about the 
goal of electricity market monitoring.  Under US antitrust law and competition in law in 
the European Union, a finding that a firm has abused its market power requires an 
enormous amount of legal process and expense.  The recent Microsoft trial in the US and 
European Union is a highly publicized example of such a process. The most difficult part 
of this process is making a finding of intent, because there are a number of benign 
explanations for market participant behavior that may appear to be an abuse of market 
power.  Because of the need to follow legal process before making a determination of 
intent, the market monitoring process should instead focus on preventing significant harm 
from the exercise of market power, regardless of the reason for this harm.  Consumers 
should be protected from significant harm that is the result of the legal unilateral actions 
of market participants, the unilateral abuse of market power, or coordinated actions 
among market participants to raise market prices.   This does not mean that antitrust and 
competition authorities should not investigate firms for abuse of market power or 
collusive behavior, but because of the extreme difficulty in making such a determination, 
the market monitoring process should leave this decision to the relevant authorities and 
focus of preventing harmful market outcomes. 
 
3.2.3.  New Zealand  
 
As noted above, until recently the New Zealand market had no formal regulatory 
commission.  The Minister of Finance and Minister of Energy for the New Zealand 
Government oversaw the operation of the NZEM.  Although there was an independent 
market monitoring committee, the NZMSC, its regulatory authority came from the 
agreement among members of the NZEM.  This was in keeping with the strategy of 
“light-handed regulation” described above. 
 
The NZMSC’s July 17, 2001 report investigating an “Undesirable Situation” 
claimed by two NZEM market participants asserted that: “(1) excessively high prices are 
being set as a result of a lack of competition in NZEM, (2) offering and other activities of 
some generators may amount to manipulative activities under Rule 2.35.2, and (3) market 
conditions could represent conduct inconsistent with the high standards of integrity, fair 
dealing and of trading required by the Rules of NZEM”  (NZMSC, p.1).  This report did 
not analyze actual generator bidding behavior and was therefore unable to quantify the 
extent of unilateral market power exercised or the extent of system-wide market power   12
reflected in the market-clearing prices during this period.  The analysis was based 
primarily on water conditions in New Zealand, demand growth and the behavior of 
market prices.  Consequently, it is not surprising the NZMSC was unable to reach any 
conclusions about the unilateral exercise of market power or the more serious charges of 
market manipulation.   
 
The results of this investigation provide another example of the difficulty 
associated with making a positive finding of market manipulation.  This experience, that 
in California and the discussion of the MALC in the UK underscores the necessity of 
shifting the focus of the market monitoring process way from a finding of market 
manipulation towards a finding of market conditions that impose significant harm to 
market efficiency and system reliability, regardless of their cause.  If the unilateral profit-
maximizing actions of market participants result in enormous wealth transfers from 
consumers of electricity to producers, then regulatory intervention should occur to fix the 
market design flaws that allow this to occur.  The focus on a finding of market 
manipulation as a necessary condition for this to occur is misguided because of the virtual 
impossibility of a finding of market manipulation, without a finding of “intent” on the 
part of a specific market participant, as noted above.  This underscores the need for a 
process to establish “intent to harm market efficiency and system reliability” as discussed 
in Wolak (2004).  A necessary condition to make this determinant is a consistent set of 
measures of market performance, a topic discussed in the next section. 
 
3.2.4.  Spain 
 
The Spanish market is another example of an electricity market with an 
inadequate market monitoring process.  Although there is a formal regulatory 
commission for the electricity industry—Comision Nacional del Sistema Electrico 
(CNSE)--its efforts to implement market reforms that limit the ability of the two major 
suppliers in Spain to exercise unilateral market power have largely been undermined by 
the Spanish government.  As early as 1999, CNSE was concerned with the lack of 
competition in the Spanish market and commissioned independent studies of the 
performance of the market.  Unfortunately, these reports were never, to my knowledge, 
publicly released. 
 
  The studies concluded that both Endese and Iberdrola, the two major suppliers in 
Spain, had the ability to move market prices through their unilateral actions.  However, 
the incentives of these firms to exploit this ability to raise prices were mitigated by a 
Competition Transition Charge (CTC) mechanism that still exists in the Spanish market.  
Several recommendations were made to reform this CTC mechanism to increase the 
competitiveness of the Spanish market.  Unfortunately, the government did not follow 
these recommendations and current conditions in the Spanish market are still very similar 
to those that existed in 1999, with the incentives of Endesa and Iberdrola to raise 
wholesale prices mitigated only by the CTC mechanism.   13
3.3.  The Need for Market Performance Measures 
Perhaps the greatest challenge faced by a market monitoring process is deciding 
when to intervene to fix market design flaws.  Often there is substantial uncertainty about 
the underlying causes of a sustained period of potential harmful market outcomes.   
Without a clear understanding of the cause, intervention in the market runs the risk of 
making things worse rather than better.  Intervention can also create incentives for 
behavior that will lead to harmful market outcomes in the future.  If firms are confident 
that regulatory intervention will occur under certain market conditions they will be 
reluctant to incur the costs necessary to become more sophisticated market participants in 
the sense of being better able to formulate strategies that reduce the likelihood these 
harmful market conditions ultimately occur.  For example, a low price cap on the spot 
market for electricity can significantly dull the incentive for retailers to sign forward 
contracts with generation unit owners which increases the likelihood of a unilateral 
market power problem in the spot market in the future. The commitment of the regulator 
to a low price cap also dulls the incentive for LSEs to sign forward contracts and make 
investments in technologies that allow price-response demand, which would eliminate the 
need for the price cap and improve the efficiency of the spot market. 
 
Consequently, in deciding whether to intervene in the market, the regulator must 
balance these two costs of regulatory intervention against the expected benefits of the 
intervention.  The costs of regulatory intervention can be reduced if the market 
monitoring process produces consistent and timely measures of market performance that 
the regulators can use to determine when intervention in the market is appropriate. 
 
3.3.1.  United States 
 
The California electricity crisis is an instructive example of how not to intervene 
to correct market design flaws.  As discussed above, FERC had little capability to 
diagnose market design flaws until long after June 2001.   The OMOI division at FERC 
had not yet been created and FERC had not set up protocols to collect and analyze data 
from the various ISOs throughout the US.  As emphasized in Wolak (2003a and 2003b), 
although FERC had a statutory mandate to set just and reasonable wholesale prices under 
the Federal Power Act of 1930, it had not yet defined a "just and reasonable price" for the 
wholesale market.  This created considerable uncertainty in the California market during 
the Summer of 2000 regarding the likelihood FERC would intervene in the California 
market. 
 
During the Summer of 2000, FERC Commissioners and staff made a number of 
public statements concerning FERC's intentions to ensure that wholesale prices in 
California were just and reasonable.  As noted in Wolak (2003a), during the late Summer 
and early Autumn of 2000, many suppliers serving the California market expected that 
FERC would order refunds for the extremely high wholesale prices during the Summer of 
2000.  Evidence of this is the fact that the measure of market performance discussed in 
Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) improved during the months of September and 
October of 2000 relative to the months of June and July of 2000.  During early November 
of 2000, FERC issued its preliminary order on the “remedies” it proposed to implement   14
in California.  As discussed above, FERC’s proposed remedies (that were eventually 
implemented) were generally acknowledged by a number of independent observers to 
enhance the ability of suppliers in California to raise wholesale prices.  As a 
consequence, market performance in November and December 2000 was even worse 
relative to the previous two months. As noted earlier, after all of these remedies were 
fully implemented on January 1, 2001 the much-publicized rolling blackouts occurred 
and average spot prices rose to over $300/MWh. 
 
The likelihood that FERC implemented inappropriate remedies would have been 
significantly reduced if it had relied upon a consistent set of indexes of market 
performance to make its diagnosis of the flaws in the California market.  In addition, had 
these indexes been monitored since the start of the California market, FERC could have 
timed its intervention to deal with the problems before they imposed significant harm on 
consumers. FERC currently requires the market monitors at all of the US ISOs to compile 
and report, at least on an annual basis, a set of market performance measures that can be 
compared across markets and over time. These indexes are designed to provide FERC 
with the necessary vital signs on market performance to diagnose design flaws before 
they can impose significant harm on market efficiency and system reliability.  In 
addition, all of the market monitors are required to file with FERC an annual state of the 
market reports providing a comprehensive analysis of market performance. 
 
3.3.2.   Other Markets 
 
The Australian market has a separate entity that prepares periodic reports on the 
performance of the National Electricity Market (NEM).  The National Electricity Code 
Administrator (NECA) is charged with administering the National Electricity Code 
governing the operation of the NEM.  Among NECA’s objectives is “to collect 
information and statistics, publish reports and disseminate information relating to 
performance, administration, enforcement and adequacy of the National Electricity Code 
and the performance of the National Electricity Market.” (p. 4, NECA, 2001).  Although 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) regulates the NEM, 
NECA oversees the operation of the NEM.  NECA prepares weekly market analyses and 
quarterly statistical digests that monitor the performance of the market.  These reports 
significantly enhance the effectiveness ACCC’s regulatory oversight. 
 
In the UK, Ofgem currently serves the role of both the market monitor and 
regulator.  It prepares annual reports on its regulation of the UK natural gas and 
electricity markets.  In New Zealand the newly formed Electricity Commission will take 
over this monitoring and regulatory role.  Spain continues to operate with CNSE as the 
market monitor and regulator. 
3.4. Public Data Release 
Public release of all data submitted to and produced by the system operator will 
increase the transparency of the wholesale market, particularly for the smaller players.  
Larger firms are more able to justify the expense of collecting the best available 
information on market outcomes.  Consequently, rather than disadvantage these smaller   15
firms, all data necessary to operate the spot market and the transmission network should 
be publicly released as soon as possible after the trading day.  
 
An additional benefit of public data release is that all market participants are 
aware that their bids, schedules and output levels are publicly available.  The fact that 
their behavior is directly observable is likely to make detection of market rule violations 
more straightforward.  Any interested party can monitor the behavior of any market 
participant using this publicly available data. 
 
Despite the many market performance advantages of public data release, few 
markets do so.  The Australian NEM is one of the few markets that follows a data release 
policy of full disclosure the next trading day of all bids, schedules and output levels.  
FERC has adopted as very peculiar data release policy in the US.  Bids, schedules and 
output levels are released with a six month lag, but market participant identities masked.  
This data release policy renders the resulting data significantly less useful for analysis of 
market performance and for providing sunshine regulation of the behavior of market 
participants.  If a firm knows that its behavior is publicly observable, even with a six 
month lag, it will be less likely to engage in behavior that may cause public outcry.  
FERC’s data release policy of concealing the identity of the market participant gives each 
market participant the ability to deny that they are engaging in the behavior found to exist 
for one or more firms.  Each firm can always claim that they are not the ones engaging in 
this behavior or they are not the one engaging in the most objectionable form of this 
behavior. 
 
Perhaps the best example of how public data release could have significantly 
enhanced the effectiveness of a regulatory process occurred during the California crisis.  
Because of data confidentiality restrictions it was impossible for the public, including the 
press, to analyze the bidding behavior of specific market participants.  Although 
confidential reports on bidding behavior and market outcomes were submitted to FERC 
by the DMA throughout the crisis period, FERC was effectively able to ignore these 
analyses of bidding behavior because its data confidentiality requirements prevented 
these studies from being made available to other interested parties and the public.  Had 
both the DMA and MSC studies, and the data they were based on, been released to the 
public immediately, it is difficult to see how the crisis would have lasted as long as it did.  
The public could have directly verified the levels of bids being submitted by all market 
participants and made their own assessment of the extent of the market power problem in 
the California market.  The unwillingness of FERC to permit the release of the bid, 
schedule and settlement data from the California ISO prevented an open analysis and 
discussion of the causes of the California crisis.  Instead, the crisis was allowed to 
continue because FERC did not take action based on the studies prepared by the DMA 
and MSC and it did not undertake its own analysis of the confidential data until the crisis 
period was largely over. 
 
  The UK Pool and New Zealand market had the policy of only releasing data to 
other members of the market.  The UK Pool would allow other parties to purchase 
portions of the data at extremely high prices.  The New Zealand market did not even   16
allow the data to be purchased.  Data release outside of the members of the NZEM was 
prohibited.  This restrictive data release policy made it impossible to undertake 
independent analyses of the two price spike periods in June from September of 2001 and 
2003.  More recently, the New Zealand government has adopted a data release policy 
with a lag, similar to that in the US, although I am not aware of any researchers having 
gained access to this data. 
3.5. Independence of Market Monitoring Process 
 
The most effective market monitoring processes are those that are perceived by 
market participants as independent of the market and system operators and the political 
process.  Public data release can be a commitment device for the regulatory process to 
maintain its independence.  Under these conditions, any interested party has the same 
data as the regulator and can perform its own analysis of an issue raised by the regulator.  
By committing to immediate public data release, the regulator is giving all entities, 
including members of the press, the ability to perform their own analysis of the data and 
reached their own conclusions about the extent of market power being exercised and 
extent of harm being imposed on specific market participants.  Therefore, full and 
immediate data release makes it extremely difficult for the regulator to conceal 
potentially harmful market outcomes to either side of the market from the public for a 
sustained period of time. 
 
Market participants also face the risk that the regulator may make decisions that 
increase their costs or reduce their revenues.  This regulatory risk increases the cost of 
participation in the wholesale market. To the extent that the market participants perceive 
the regulatory process as independent, this risk is reduced. 
 
As noted above, operating the market or system to serve the needs of the market 
or system operator can often impose unnecessary costs on market participants.   
Consequently, a market monitoring process internal to the market or system operator may 
find it difficult to make recommendations for market rule changes that require greater 
effort by the market operator or system operator even if these changes best serve the 
needs of market participants.  One role of the market monitoring process is to oversee the 
wholesale market operator and the system operator.  For this reason, it must be 
independent of both of these entities. 
 
3.5.1.   United States 
  
As California market participants discovered, once the political winds turned 
against the energy traders, due in part to the bankruptcy of Enron, a number of traders 
were arrested for actions that many observers argued had been going on since the start of 
the market in April of 1998 without objections from FERC and the California Public 
Utilities Commission. Although several of trading strategies outlined in the “Enron 
Memos” involved illegal activities, such as selling non-firm energy purchased outside of 
California as a firm energy delivery to California, a number of these strategies simply 
attempted to arbitrage differences in electricity prices across the markets over time and   17
across locations.  Nevertheless, once the Enron meltdown occurred, even these arbitrage 
strategies were used as evidence to convict Enron in the court of public opinion. A more 
independent regulatory process may have been able to distinguish between legal and 
illegal activities by the Enron traders. The actions by the state and federal criminal 
authorities in response to these memos have created significant regulatory risk for 
merchant energy suppliers. This has partially caused many of them to shut down or 
significantly downsize their energy trading affiliates.  If one takes the position that many 
of the actions energy traders were arrested for in 2001 and 2002 routinely occurred in 
1998 and 1999, then this sequence of events provides a valuable lesson about the 
importance of a regulatory process that is independent of the political process.  If the 
regulatory process had been perceived as more independent, the Enron bankruptcy and 
prosecution of traders for illegal behavior could have occurred without the almost 
complete decimation of the energy trading sector. 
 
3.5.2.  UK Experience 
 
The transition from the Pool to NETA in the UK was largely a political decision.  
Virtually all of the academics studying the UK Pool argued against this change.  Their 
argument was that the divestitures of generation capacity and new entry that had taken 
place throughout the 1990s had largely solved the market power problem that existed 
during the early and mid-1990s. There was very little rigorous empirical analysis of the 
likely benefits of the reform.  The high cost of obtaining the bids and market outcomes 
data made it difficult, if not impossible, for researchers to undertake such an analysis.  
Moreover, because Ofgem was a major advocate of NETA, it had little incentive to 
undertake such an analysis.  The significant wholesale electricity price decline that 
occurred following the implementation of NETA has fueled a debate over whether it or 
the significant generation divestitures and new generation entry during the 1990’s caused 
the price decline.  Greater independence between the regulatory process and the political 
process could have allowed a more impartial and detailed analysis of the need to incur the 
significant cost associated with implementing NETA. 
 
The UK Uplift Management Incentive Scheme (UMIS) implemented by Offer 
during the Pool regime provides an instructive example of the type of problems that 
might arise if the market monitoring function was part of the market or system operation.  
Under the Pool rules, National Grid Company (NGC) was responsible for managing the 
costs of all deviations from day-ahead energy schedules and procurement of the ancillary 
services necessary to run the system in real-time.  These costs were recovered through a 
per MWh uplift payment.  Over time these uplift costs rose substantially, until Offer 
implemented a regulatory mechanism that capped the maximum amount of uplift charges 
that NGC could pass on to consumers through the UMIS.  As a result of the UMIS, the 
amount of uplift charges paid by consumers declined substantially.  The experience of 
Offer with the UMIS underscores the significant market efficiency gains possible from 
effective monitoring of the performance of the system and market operator, as well as 
market participants. 
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3.5.3.  Australia  
 
NECA fulfills many of the tasks of an independent market monitor for the 
Australian electricity market.  It periodically prepares market analysis reports that are 
released to the market using data on bids, schedules and output levels released by the 
National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) on its web-site that day 
after the market operates.  Although NECA’s authority as the National Electricity Code 
administrator comes from the ACCC, NECA satisfies the independence criteria described 
above.  Australia also has a number of other market monitoring entities.  The Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) is a government economic 
research agency noted for its independent research and analysis.  It periodically prepares 
reports and analyses of Australian energy markets, including electricity.  The National 
Competition Council was established by all Australian governments in November 1995 
to act as a policy advisory body to oversee the implementation of National Competition 
Policy (NCP).  It oversees competition policy as it is applied to the electricity industry. 
The Productivity Commission, the Australian Government's principal review and 
advisory body on microeconomic policy and regulation, conducts public inquiries and 
research into a broad range of economic and social issues including: competition policy, 
productivity, the environment, economic infrastructure, labor markets, trade and 
assistance, structural adjustment and microeconomic reform.  It has also been an active 
participant in the Australian electricity reform process.  The public availability of 
wholesale market data has allowed each of these entities to provide an informed 
perspective on conditions in the NEM to the ACCC and public at large.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
One positive outcome from the California electricity crisis is that a market 
monitoring process is currently being put in place throughout the US to ensure that such a 
sequence of events will not occur again.  Although there are still problems with interested 
parties gaining access to data from the wholesale market to perform the necessary 
analyses, FERC is currently working to put in place a market monitoring process that is 
forward-looking, fully integrated with and supported by its regulatory process, uses 
consistent measures of market performance and relies on independent market monitoring 
entities at the wholesale market level. 
 
The Australian market provides an instructive example of the necessary 
foundation for a very effective market monitoring process: (1) rapid public disclosure of 
all relevant market data, and (2) the availability of entities with the time, expertise and 
legal mandate to prepare reports on market performance using this data.  As I have 
emphasized previously, market monitoring is fundamentally about providing smart 
sunshine regulation (Wolak, 2004).   Providing state-of-the-art analysis with the best 
possible data, and making this information available to the relevant regulatory authority 
is a necessary condition for effective market monitoring.   
 
As the experience of the California ISO DMA and MSC during the period June 
2000 to June 2001 illustrates, an additional necessary condition is that the regulatory   19
authority fully supports the market monitoring process.  This requires open lines of 
communication between the market monitor and the regulatory agency.  The regulatory 
agency must also be willing to rely on the market monitor’s analysis in regulatory 
decision-making. 
 
A final point to emphasize from international experience is that market monitoring 
is a process of continuous improvement.  All markets have had to modify their market 
monitoring protocols in response to events in their markets.  The events in the US and 
New Zealand triggered enormous changes in their market monitoring process, but other 
countries have also implemented or are considering changes in their market monitoring 
processes to respond to events in their wholesale markets.   20
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